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UNCED and the Development of
International Environmental Law
PETER H. SAND*
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from June 3
to 14, 1992, was the largest UN Conference ever held, with more
than 30,000 participants from 176 countries, including 103 heads
of state or government assembled for the concluding "Earth
Summit."' In terms of diplomatic history, the Rio meeting is
thus comparable to major multilateral peace conferences, such
as the 1815 Vienna Congress or the 1919 Versailles Conference.
The peace and security perspective may indeed not be far-fetched:
in his opening statement to the UNCED Preparatory Committee
in March 1990, the Secretary General had already pointed out
that "in this case, the security of our planet and our species is
at risk. Surely this must be seen as the ultimate security risk
which calls for the ultimate security alliance." ' 2 Post-Rio apprais-
als would confirm that assessment.
3
* Legal Adviser, Environmental Affairs, World Bank Legal Department, Wash-
ington, DC; formerly Principal Legal Officer, United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED). Views and opinions expressed are those of the author
and should not be attributed to the institutions with which he is or was associated.
This work is printed as it appears in 3 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 3-17 (1992).
1 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992) UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1, 2 vols. (1992);
complete directory of registered participants in WHO is WHO AT THE EARTH SUMMIT, Rio
DE JANEIRO 1992, (H.J. Keller, ed., Visionlink 1992).
2 Maurice F. Strong, Statement to the Organizational Session of the Preparatory
Committee, March 5, 1990. See P.H. Sand, International Law on the Agenda of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Towards Global Envi-
ronmental Security?, 60 NoRsnc J. INT'L L. 5-18 (1991); and 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L. 425-
30 (1991).
' See James Gustave Speth, A Post Rio Compact, FOR IoN Poucy, No. 88 (Fall
1992), pp. 145-161. The outcome of UNCED has been analysed in a large number of
studies, most of which tend to declare the conference a qualified success; e.g., see Peter
M. Haas, Marc A. Levy and Edward A. Parson, Appraising the Earth Summit: How
Should We Judge UNCED's Success?, ENVIRONMENT, vol. 34, No, 8 (October 1992),
pp. 6-15, 26-36; Richard N. Gardner, Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities after Rio,
(Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1992); Lothar Brock, Nord-Sajd Kontroversen
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.
As might be expected from a diplomatic conference, Rio had
its share of diplomatic problems-starting from controversies
over where it should be held, 4 who should and who should not
attend,5 and whether it should be postponed or cancelled alto-
gether. 6 In the end, these problems were resolved with little more
than anecdotal impact. The basic question remains, however,
whether the Conference accomplished its substantive objectives,
and to what extent it satisfied the high-perhaps excessive-
expectations of participants and observers.
The present analysis will not attempt to answer this question
for the full range of the UNCED agenda, as defined by the
broad conference mandate of UN General Assembly Resolution
44/228. 7 Instead, it will be confined to the specific legal-insti-
tutional matters assigned to the Conference, in particular its
Working Group 111.1
in der internationalen Umweltpolitik: Von der taktischen Verknipfung zur Integration
von Umwelt und Entwicklung?, HSFK-REPORT 7/1992 (Hessian Foundation for Peace
and Conflict Research: Frankfurt, September 1992), 39 pp.; and Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Outcome and the Follow-up, AALCC/UNGAI92/2 (October 1992), 131.
1 In anticipation of the North-South compromises that were to mark UNCED
(see text at note 74 below), Brazil was preferred over potential other venues such as
Sweden (where the 20th anniversary of the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment could have been celebrated), though balanced by the appointment
of Canadian Maurice Strong as Secretary-General.
I Austrian President Waldheim, who had planned to attend, was persuaded not
to go. US President Bush, who had planned not to attend, was finally persuaded to go.
When the planned attendance of Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa was prevented by
last-minute political events at home, an attempt to have his prepared speech delivered
to the Earth Summit by videotape ran into UN protocol objections. Instead of EC
Environment Commissioner Ripa di Meana, who refused to attend, EC Commission
President Delors attended, following an ad hoc amendment of the rules of procedure
by the UN General Assembly granting him near-equal treatment with heads of govern-
ment (Resolutions 46/469-471 of April 13, 1992). Haiti was represented by exiled Pres-
ident Aristide. As to the representation of Yugoslavia, the credentials of the Serbia-
Montenegro delegation were accepted despite reservations recorded by the USA and the
EC (A/CONF.151/26, vol. IV, paras. 7 and 14).
6 The original dates of June 1-12 were changed by Resolution 46/468 of the UN
General Assembly in April 1992 in order to facilitate attendance by Islamic statesmen
after the Ramadan religious holidays. An internal political scandal implicating Brazil's
President Collor de Mello erupted one week before the Conference hosted and chaired
by him, and three months later led to his impeachment and eventual resignation.
I Resolution 44/228 of December 22, 1989; see also Resolutions 45/211 of De-
cember 21, 1990; 46/168 of December 19, 1991; and 46/468 of April 13, 1992.
1 Working Group III on legal, institutional and other related matters was estab-
lished by the UNCED Preparatory Committee at its second session in March 1991, with
terms of reference specified in PrepCom decision 2/3, UN Doc. A/46/48,.vol. 1, p. 28,
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The Rio Conference may be seen as another incremental step
in the evolution of international environmental law, adding fur-
ther material to the growing body of legal norms in this field-
which by now is well-documented in the Register of International
Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment,
regularly updated by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), 9 and in a wide range of official and unofficial
collections of relevant texts. 0 In fact, the direct impact of
UNCED on this ongoing evolutionary process was best illus-
trated by a UNEP-sponsored meeting of Senior Government
Officials Expert in Environmental Law, held in Rio de Janeiro
from October 30 to November 2, 1991.11 Convened with a man-
text in 2 Y.B. ITrr'L E"v. L. 426 n.11 (1991). Negotiations in the Working Group
(chaired by former Czechoslovakian Environment Minister Moldan) were mainly con-
ducted in open-ended sub-groups moderated by diplomats from India, Malaysia, Norway,
and the Philippines. After the end of the fourth PrepCom session in New York (March-
April 1992), a few remaining issues were resolved in the Main Committee at the Rio
Conference (under PrepCom chairman Koh from Singapore), through contact groups
led by Egyptian Ambassador EI-Arabi and Malaysian Ambassador Razali. A summary
account of the day-to-day proceedings of the Preparatory Committee (including Working
Group III) and the Rio Conference is available in the EARTH Stmmrr BunEN issued
-during the sessions by the International Institute for Sustainable Development"(IISD).
See also C. Tinker, Institutional Developments: The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L 68-71 (1991); A.O. Adede, Inter-
national Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: An Overview of Past Lessons and
Future Challenges, 22 ENV. PoL'Y & L. 88-105 (1992); Nicholas C. Yost, Rio and the
Road Beyond, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Quarterly Newsletter of the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Standing Committee on Environmental Law), vol. II, No. 4 (Summer 1992)
pp. 1-6; and The Role of Law in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (American Bar Association: Standing Committee on Environmental
Law, 1992).
1 The 1991 edition of the Register (UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4, currently under revision
for the 1993 Governing Council session) contains information on 152 multilateral treaties.
11 Including the UNEP Reference Series 3, SELECTED MLTILATERAL TREATIES IN
THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT, vol. 1 (A.C. Kiss ed., 1983), 525 pp., and vol. 2 (I.
Rummel-Bulska & S. Osafo ed., 1991), 527 pp.; the 5 trilingual loose-leaf volumes of
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: MULTILATERAL TREATIES (W.E. Burhenne & 0.
Seidel eds., 1974-1992); the 30 volumes of INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRoN-
MENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (B. Rdster & B. Simma eds. 1975-1983),
updated since 1989 by 3 loose-leaf volumes; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
PRIn&AY MATERIALS (M.R. Molitor ed., 1991), 571 pp.; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES (E.B. Weiss, P.C. Szasz & D.B. Magraw
eds., 1992), 749 pp.; WORLD TREATmS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (T.
Scovazki & T. Treves eds. 1992), 720 pp; BASIc DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW (H. Hohmann ed., 1992), 3 vols., 1850 pp.
1 See the report of the meeting, UNEP/Env.Law/2/3 (1991); see 1. Rummel-
Bulska, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L. 382-
391 (1991).
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date to revise the long-term Montevideo Programme for the
Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law orig-
inally formulated in 1981,12 the 1991 meeting reached an impasse
because most of the delegates refused to make any programmatic
decisions on this subject prior to the 1992 "Earth Summit."
While one of the reasons for this refusal was the overriding
broader mandate of UNCED for both environmental and devel-
opmental matters, their main concern was the perceived role of
UNCED as charting the course of future environmental law-
making. In the end, UNEP had to convene a resumed session
in Nairobi, in September 1992, in order to finalize its revision
of the Montevideo Programme on the basis of the UNCED
outcomes. 11
I. HARD OR SOrT RULEs?
It has become habitual to categorize international environ-
mental provisions in terms of "hard law" and "soft law,"
depending on whether or not they meet formal treaty criteria.
4
By this yardstick, the normative products of UNCED-the "Rio
Instruments" "-are readily identified: on the one hand, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, both prepared by par-
allel intergovernmental negotiating committees and opened for
12 UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2, Annex, Ch.lI (1981), adopted by UNEP Governing
Council decision 10/21 on May 31, 1982, and endorsed by UN General Assembly
Resolution 37/217; see P.H. Sand, Environmental Law in the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, in: THE FutruR oF THE INTERNATioNAL LAW oF THE ENVIRONMENT
(R.J. Dupuy ed., 1985) p. 51; and C.A. Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental
Law, 5 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 351-391, at 364 (1990).
" See the report of the meeting, UNEP/Env.Law/2-2/L.2 (1992), Annex I: Pr ,-
gramme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law.
14 See P.M. Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 420-435 (1991); G. Hand], Environmental Security and Global Change:
The Challenge to International Law, I Y.B. INr'L ENV. L. 3-33 (1990), at 7-8; and
generally C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 138 INT'L & Corp. L. Q. 850-866 (1989); and H.E. Chodosh, Neither
Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declaratory International Law, 26 TEXAS INT'L
L. J. 87-124 (1991).
" Texts in 31 I.L.M. 814-887 (1992); 22 ErrVTL. POi'Y & L. 251, 268 (1992); and
THE EARTH Summr (S. Johnson ed., London 1991), 576 pp. On the negotiations leading
up to the Rio Conference, see T. Goldman & S. Hajost, Global Climate, 2 Y.B. INT'L
Ewv. L. 111-115 (1991); C. de Klemm, Nature Conservation: Biological Diversity and
Natural Areas, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. 201-204 (1991); and G. Biggs, Latin American
Perspectives on UNCED, 2 Y.B. INT'L Ewv. L. 431-448 (1991). See also note 8 above.
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signature at Rio as formal multilateral treaties; on the other
hand, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(consisting of 27 principles) and the separate set of 15 Principles
for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, both adopted
by the Conference and subsequently endorsed by the United
Nations General Assembly as declaratory and exhortatory acts.'
6
In practical terms, the distinction is somewhat less clear-cut.
The conventions will, of course, become legally binding only
three months after they obtain the necessary minimum number
of ratifications; with the Climate Change Convention having
scored 9 of 50 and the Biodiversity Convention 7 of 30 ratifi-
cations as of December 31, 1992, that is unlikely to happen
before mid-1993 .17 Any substantive analysis of the two conven-
tions will have to concede that-save as to institutional provi-
sions-the obligations they impose on Contracting Parties for
the time being are largely aspirational, and hence may appear
no less "soft" than those formulated in the two declaratory
instruments. 8 This is at least partly due to the fact that both
conventions make use of the "framework approach" that has
become a favorite technique of international environmental law-
making: rather than attempting to codify a sectoral regime once
and for all, they start out by defining its normative scope in
very general language, to be specified only later in a dynamic
sequence of subsequent "protocols."19
It is worth recalling that this framework technique made its
first appearance in environmental treaty drafting in 1974, when
the Spanish delegation proposed a "convenio-marco" with sep-
arate protocols to protect the marine environment of the Medi-
16 UNGA Resolution 47/190 of December 22, 1992, endorsing the principles pro-
claimed (paragraph 2) and urging governments and organizations to take the necessary
action for follow-up (paragraph 4).
" See the criteria for entry into force of the Climate Change Convention (Article
23) and the Biodiversity Convention (Article 36); see also D. Bodansky, Managing
Climate Change, and F. Burhenne-Guilmin & S. Casey-Lefkowitz, The Convention on
Biological Diversity: A Hard-Won Global Achievement, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L. 43-59,
60-74 (1992).
18 E.g., compare the principles of the Rio Declaration and those proclaimed in
Article 3 of the Climate Change Convention, which overlap and actually influenced each
other during the parallel drafting process.
19 Handl (note 14 above), at 5-7; and T. Gehring, International Environmental
Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems, I Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. 35-56 (1990).
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terranean. 0 After its adoption in the 1976 Barcelona Convention
and its protocols,2 the technique was applied and further devel-
oped by UNEP in a series of agreements for other regional
seas," wildlife conservation" and protection of the ozone layer
2 4
Other examples include the UN/ECE Conventions on Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution25 and on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
26
Both the Climate Change Convention (Article 17) and the Bio-
diversity Convention (Article 28) anticipate the future develop-
ment of protocols along these lines, which-without requiring
participation by all Parties-allow for the progressive specifica-
tion of commitments among those Parties ready and able to
move ahead.
The Rio conventions are thus essential building blocks for a
future climate and biodiversity regime; they are "intermediate
agreements" open to adjustment and supplementary regulation
as required.2 7 Unlike the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea,28 however, they are not genuine global codifications.
The oceans regime that emerged from UNCLOS III may be
defined as a self-contained new international order for the ma-
rine sector, allocating rights and responsibilities of States over
the available ocean space and affirming a comprehensive re-
source-oriented approach that embraces all potential uses and
users of the resource. By contrast, the 1992 UN Framework
10 At the Third Diplomatic Conference of Mediterranean States on the Law of the
Sea (Athens, March 1974): see J.A. de Yturriaga (ed.), LA AcTuAL REVISION DEL DERECHO
DEL MAR: UNA PERSPECTIVA SPANOLA, VOL. 11/2, 521-525 (Madrid 1974). The equivalent
French term "convention-cadre" has also been used by the Council of Europe, in the
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Com-
munities or Authorities (Madrid, May 21, 1980), 20 I.L.M. 315 (1981).
21 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976), 19 I.L.M. 869 (1980).
The 1978 Kuwait, 1981 Abidjan, 1981 Lima, 1982 Jeddah, 1983 Cartagena, 1985
Nairobi, and 1986 Noumea Conventions and their respective protocols, texts in P.H.
SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
(London 1988).
" The 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals, 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980), and its supplementary agreements for protected species.
' The 1985 Vienna Convention and its 1987 Montreal Protocol, 26 I.L.M. 1529,
1550 (1987).
18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979); and the protocols in 24 I.L.M. 484 (1985), 27 I.L.M.
707 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 214 (1989), 31 I.L.M. 573 (1992).
m Signed at Helsinki (March 17, 1992), text in 3 Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. (1992).
27 See Gehring (note 19 above), and J.T. Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FoRIoN
AFF. 162, 176 (1989).
22 Signed at Montego Bay, December 10, 1982; 21 1.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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Convention on Climate Change is not a "Convention on the
Law of the Air," as some had pretended it should be, at least
until the Ottawa meeting in 1989.29 It does not even attempt to
define or allocate sovereign rights over airspace, the vertical
delimitation of which will continue to nourish legal debates in
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COP-
UOS). The mandate of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee30 was limited to protection against global warming
risks and to the specific uses and misuses of the atmosphere
affecting this issue; the mandate did not extend to a global
regime of the atmosphere. Similarly, even a generous reading of
the Convention on Biological Diversity will not elevate it to a
global regime for the Earth's living resources. The crucial ques-
tions of intellectual property rights and of safety against the
risks of biotechnology were deferred to future cooperation and
possible protocols,3 although even the prospect of international
regulation in this field proved too much for at least one coun-
try. 3
2
Even the hard-fought compromise text of the Rio Declaration
has been ranked as "intermediate" by as competent a commen-
tator as Maurice Strong, when he suggested in his closing state-
ment to the Conference that the Declaration "must continue to
evolve towards what many of us hope will be an Earth Charter
that could be finally sanctioned on the 50th anniversary of the
United Nations in 1995." 3 As it stands, the Declaration repre-
29 Protection of the Atmosphere: Statement of the International Meeting of Legal
and Policy Experts, Ottawa, February 1989; see also J. Bruce, Law of the Air: A
Conceptual Outline, 18 ENv. PoL'Y & L. 5 (1988).
- UN General Assembly Resolutions 45/212 of December 21, 1990; 46/169 of
December 19, 1991; and 47/195 of December 23, 1992.
3 Articles 16(5) and 19(3); see K. Miller & C. Barber, Biodiversity After the Earth
Summit: Prospects for the Convention on Biodiversity, NErwoax '92 No. 18 (Geneva:
Centre for Our Common Future, July 1992) p. 5.
32 See the US declaration made at the UNEP Conference for the Adoption of the
Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nairobi, May 22, 1992), 31
I.L.M. 848 (1992).
,1 M.F. Strong, Statement to the Plenary on June 14, 1992; 22 ENV. PoL'Y & L.
243 (1992). See H. Mann. The Rio Declaration, [1992] ASIL, PROCEsDiNOs 405-411, for
an appraisal of the PrepCom negotiations, reflecting the disappointment of a number
of participants over the "missed historic opportunity" for an Earth Charter. Indirectly,
paragraph 39.5 of Agenda 21 acknowledges unfinished business in this regard, by
reserving the option of future "examination of the feasibility of elaborating general
rights and obligations of States, as appropriate, in the field of sustainable development,
as provided by General Assembly Resolution 44/228."
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sents a delicate balance of policy goals supported by developed
and developing countries, reflected mainly in two sets of key
principles without which the compromise would have collapsed:
on the one hand, public participation, the "precautionary ap-
proach," and the "polluter pays" maxim (Principles 10, 15 and
16) considered as essential by the developed countries; on the
other hand, the "right to development," poverty alleviation and
the recognition of "common but differentiated responsibilities"
(Principles 3, 5 and 7) on which the developing countries in-
sisted.34 While the Declaration's preamble reaffirms the 1972
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment35 in its en-
tirety, Principle 2 actually modifies the wording of Principle 21
of the Stockholm text by adding the words "and developmental"
to the assertion of national environmental policies for resource
exploitation. The nuance is perhaps less significant in sub-
stance-resource use being inherently "developmental"
anyway 36-than in the process of law-making, considering that
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration is widely considered
as having become a rule of customary international law. 7 Even
though the Rio Declaration could hardly be deemed to have
brought about an "instant amendment" of customary law, the
UNCED experience highlights the need to clarify processes of
change and adjustment for "hard" and "soft" rules alike.
Ii. NON-LAW OR PRE-LAW OUTCOMES?
The very success of soft-law instruments in guiding the ev-
olution of contemporary international environmental law has
also produced a backlash effect: governments have become wary
, The compromise wording of the controversial third sentence of principle 7 was
actually based on a statement of the OECD Ministerial Meeting on Environment and
Development, Paris, December 3, 1991; 2 Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. 529 (1991), disk doc. 24,
para. 5. The US delegation, while joining consensus on the Declaration at Rio, submitted
an interpretative statement expressing reservations on principles 3, 7, 12 and 23 (A/
CONF.151/26, vol. IV, paragraph 16).
- 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972); see L.B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 14 RARv. INT'L L.J. 423-515 (1973).
m Contrary to a common misconception, the Stockholm Declaration was not
limited to "environmental" concerns and did address development issues, especially in
principles 8 and 11; see Sohn (note 35 above), at 464-466, 469.
"E.g., see A. Kss & D. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 106-107
(1991); N. FrrzwAmoA, THE 1972 UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN ENvi-
RONMENT ANM ITs JuRnIcAL FRONTIERS: DISSERTATIVE TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Nottingham 1991); and Mann (note 33 above) at 410.
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of attempts at formulating reciprocal principles even when
couched in non-mandatory terms, well knowing that "soft"
declarations or recommendations have a tendency to harden over
time and to come back to haunt their authors. 8 Hence, the
tactical desire to guard against legal connotations of the terms
used (as illustrated by the US statement of interpretation after
the Rio Declaration was adopted) 9 or against eventual "legali-
zation" of pre-legal terms (as illustrated by the US position on
"concepts or principles significant for the future of environmen-
tal law" during the UNEP follow-up meeting in September
1992). 40
Similar tactical concerns explain the curious warning label
("non-legally binding") affixed to the Rio Forest Principles.
4 '
Originally envisaged as the blueprint for a binding treaty'42 "el-
ements for a global consensus" are all that remained after ex-
tensive and often acrimonious negotiations within and outside
the UNCED Preparatory Committee, marked by strong resis-
tance from Third-World timber-producing countries against
mandatory multilateral regulation in this field. One basic reason
for their resistance was the perceived threat to sovereignty from
a treaty regime, in view of unabashed proposals from developed
countries for global intervention by UN "green helmets" in
uFor pertinent examples see T.M. FwuxcK & E. WEBsRAND, WORD PoLrncs:
VERBAL SRATEoy AMONG TSm SuPEpow Rs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
" See note 34 above.
Report (note 13 above), paragraphs 22 and 23. In view of strong opposition
mainly from the US delegation, a proposed list of concepts and principles for further
development was deleted from the draft UNEP programme document and merely repro-
duced in the body of the meeting report, as follows: "precautionary approach, polluter-
pays principle, common concern of mankind, inter-generational equity, new and equi-
table global partnership, common but differentiated responsibility, public participation,
and market-based approaches."
4 Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus
on the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests,
A/CONF.151/26, vol.111, Annex [II. On the earlier negotiations see J. Cameron, Forests,
2 Y.B. Nrr'L ENv. L. 213-215 (1991). See also note 74 below.
41 E.g., see the proposal for an International Convention on Conservation and
Development of Forests submitted in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) Committee on Forestry in September 1990 (COFO-90/3/a), and
eventually deferred to UNCED in the 99th FAO Council Session in June 1991 (FAO
doc. CL99/PV/14); and the proposal for a World Forest Agreement/ Convention, by
the Global Legislators' Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) in January
1991. A Japanese proposal for an International Charter for the World's Forests was
submitted in the International Tropical limber Organization in 1991. Further intergov-
ernmental initiatives, led by Sweden, are currently under consideration.
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pursuit of an alleged droit d'ingdrence 6cologique,4 or more
subtle calls for the international community to assume its "joint
responsibility for areas whose ecological significance far sur-
passes that of the countries in which they are situated geograph-
ically: the Amazon region, the Himalayas, Antarctica, certain
seas, and areas constituting part of the 'common heritage of
mankind."'"4 Not unpredictably, the reaction of the Amazon
region's military commander, Brazilian General Sotero Vaz, is
also on record: "I will tell you, and tell you clearly: if those
babacas try to come here, we will hit them like guerrillas.
' 4
The deadlock resulting from this confrontation of extreme
views prevented agreement even on the question of future treaty
negotiations, save for consideration of "the need for and the
feasibility of all kinds of appropriate internationally agreed ar-
rangements to promote international cooperation" on forestry.4
Paradoxically, therefore, the elaborate set of forest principles
produced by the Rio Conference represents less substantial pro-
gress than the single paragraph (12.40) of its Agenda 21 calling
for a new Convention to Combat Desertification to be finalized
by 1994-which has since been heeded by a UN General Assem-
bly resolution getting the process underway.
4 7
By the same token, several new "conference diplomacy"
initiatives launched under the oceans chapter of Agenda 21 (with
regard to small island States, straddling fish stocks, and land-
,7 See R. Cans, L'ingerence ecologique, LE MONDE of November 28, 1991, at 8;
C. Cans, L'ingerence verte: assistance ou intervention?, LES CARlERS DU FuTuR: EN v-
RONNEMENT- DEVELOPPEMENT No. 2 (August 1992) 12-16; and U. Kulke, Grenzenlose
Einmischung, NATUR No. 12 (December 1991) 34-35. But see also H.M. De Lemos,
Amazonia: In Defense of Brazil's Sovereignty, 14 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFsFARS
301-312 (1990).
- J. Pronk, A New International Ecological Order, 14 INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR
728-732 (1991), at 729-730. Mr. Pronk, Netherlands Minister for Development Cooper-
ation, was one of the chief negotiators at the Rio Conference and subsequently co-
chaired the UN Secretary General's high-level advisory panel on UNCED follow-up; see
UN Press Release SG/A/503 of August 12, 1992.
41 Interview with E. Ribeiro on August 28, 1991, translation in CROSSCUtRENCTS:
AN INDEPENDENT NGO NEWSPAPER FOR UNCED No. 10 (September 1991) at 12.
Agenda 21, paragraph 11.12(e). See N. Yost (note 8 above), at 5-6. The final
text of Agenda 21 is reproduced in the report of the Rio Conference (note 1 above) as
Annex II, in volumes I-1l1.
17 UNGA Resolution 47/188 of December 22, 1992, establishing an intergovern-
mental negotiating committee for the elaboration of an international convention to
combat desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertifi-
cation, particularly in Africa. The first meetings are scheduled to be held in New York
(January 25-29) and in Nairobi (March 29 to April 8, 1993).
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based marine pollution)4 may well turn out to have more tan-
gible-albeit deferred-legal outcomes than some of the provi-
sions ostensibly calling for the development of further
international law (such as Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration,
with regard to liability and compensation for transboundary
harm) .49
In a few instances, the Rio Conference chose to delegate
specific legal topics to future action in other competent fora:
e.g., in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with
regard to preparation of a nuclear safety convention; 0 and in
the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly with regard
to environmental protection in times of armed conflict,"' delib-
erately side-stepping the wider issue of "ecological crimes" as
originally raised in the UNCED Preparatory Committee.12 As
regards the issue of potential conflicts between environment and
4 Agenda 21, paragraphs 17.26, 17.49 and 17.130, followed by UNGA Resolutions
47/189 and 47/192, deciding to convene a global conference on the sustainable devel-
opment of small developing island States (Barbados, April 1994) and a conference on
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks (New York, July 1993), respectively. The
1992 UNEP Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental
Law (note 13 above) calls on the UNEP Governing Council to convene another confer-
ence on the protection of the marine environment from land-based activities.
,1 The Declaration's call for cooperation "in an expeditious and more determined
manner" conveys a certain amount of frustration with the lack of progress in this field
in spite of exhortations in principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration. Contrary to earlier
expectations - e.g. G. Hafner, Civil Liability and Other Forms of Transnational
Accountability, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L. 91, at 98 (1991) - the relevant chapters of Agenda
21 make no provision for follow-up on this topic. However, the 1992 UNEP Programme
for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law (note 13 above) includes
"legal and administrative mechanisms for the prevention and redress of pollution and
other environmental damage."
" Agenda 21, paragraph 39.7. See N. Pelzer, Nuclear Energy, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV.
L. 150-155 (1991), at 153-154.
11 Agenda 21, paragraph 39.6, stipulating that the specific competence and role of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are to be taken into account.
However, in its report to the General Assembly (A/47/328, July 1992) the ICRC
emphasized the need for better compliance with existing international rules in this field,
rather than the development of new instruments as advocated by others; e.g., see G.
PLANT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND TnE LAW OF WAR: A "Fn'm GENEVA" CON-
VENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF' Ti ENVIRONMENT IN TD&Es OF ARMED CONFLIcT
(London 1992).
12 By the EC delegation, prompted by a joint declaration of the Russian and
German Environment Ministers (Moscow, June 3, 1991) calling for "international con-
demnation of crimes against the environment," and for inclusion of the topic in the
UNCED agenda. After further debate of the issue in the UN General Assembly and at
PrepCom 4, the Main Committee of the Rio Conference eventually decided to follow
proposals by the USA and several developing countries and restricted the scope of
paragraph 39.6 in Agenda 21 to times of armed conflict.
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trade law, the Rio Conference was unable to move beyond the
status quo reflected in identical terms in both chapter 2 and
chapter 39 of Agenda 21, which were taken verbatim from the
earlier Cartagena Commitment of the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD)5 3 Attempts to include this issue
in the future work plan of UNEP, at the subsequent Nairobi
meeting in September 1992, met with solid opposition both from
the USA and from a number of developing countries and had
to be deferred;54 as a result, the forum competent to elaborate
the UNCTAD-based "principles and rules" on trade and envi-
ronment identified in Agenda 21 remains unspecified, and-de
facto or faute de mieux-now is the "Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade" of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)".
Reference should also be made to the "alternative treaties"
prepared at Rio by the International NGO Forum, in the context
of the parallel independent-sector "Global Forum '92" attended
by more than 8000 non-governmental groups and organiza-
tions . 6 Not intended as legally binding instruments, nor as a
substitute for the important simultaneous input of NGOs to the
official UNCED process and other ongoing efforts at interna-
tional environmental law-making, 7 the "alternative treaties"
served mainly as a focus of civic interaction between NGOs in
the joint articulation of goals and action plans. Significantly,
" UNCTAD, 8th session (Cartagena, February 1992), text in 22 ENv. POL'Y & L.
134 (1992), reproduced in paragraphs 2.22(i) and 39.3(d) of Agenda 21.
" Report (note 13 above), paragraph 24 and annex II; "environment and trade"
was, however, retained as one of the topics for future consideration among "additional
subjects".
1 The Group (originally established in 1971 but not convened until 1991) has held
a total of seven meetings in Geneva during 1992, dealing with (1) trade provisions in
existing multilateral environmental agreements, (2) multilateral transparency of national
environmental regulations likely to have trade effects, and (3) trade effects of new
packaging and labelling requirements aimed at protecting the environment. For back-
ground see F. Weiss, GATT, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENV. L. 346-353 (1991), at 351-352.
P. Padbury, NGOs Sign Alternative Treaties at the '92 Global Forum, NETWORK
'92 No. 18 (Geneva: Centre for Our Common Future, June-July 1992) p. 17; see also
E. Parson, P.M. Haas & M.A. Levy, A Summary of the Major Documents Signed at
the Earth Summit and the Global Forum, 34 ENVIRONMENT No. 8 (October 1992) 12, at
35-36; and NGO Treaties, E & D Fnm vol. II No. 1 (New York: United Nations Non-
Governmental Liaison Service, December 1992).
D E.g., the Draft Covenant on Environmental Conservation and Sustainable Use
of Natural Resources prepared by an ad hoc NGO working group of experts under the
aegis of the Commission on Environmental Law of the World Conservation Union
(IUCN); Draft 5 (1992). See also note 60 below.
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though, instead of delivering final texts as conference products,
the Forum decided to turn them into "open documents" for
continuous development through electronic networking. 8 The
preference, here again, was for an open-ended process of insti-
tutional learning, in close parallel to what Jessica Mathews has
called the new "fluid" model of environmental regimes59 that
best describes the Rio outcomes.
III. UN REFORM OR UN BYPASS?
The UNCED preparatory process also generated high hopes
for global institutional reform, reflected in a wide array of bold
new proposals for restructuring the United Nations system to
cope with the environment/development problematique and for
improving the established patterns of international decision-mak-
ing and governance generally.60 As illustrated by the UNCED
Secretariat's compilation of submissions from governments, in-
tergovernmental and non-governmental organizations,6 the spec-
trum ranged from ambitious visions of world government
(including a global environmental legislature, an Ecological Se-
curity Council, and an international environment tribunal) to
new methods of standard-setting, enforcement and dispute pre-
vention.
11 The computer conference on which the 46 draft "treaties" are available is
managed by a Uruguay-based communications network (NGONet), with follow-up pro-
moted by regional focal points; list in NETWORK No. 20 (Geneva: Centre for Our
Common Future, October 1992), p. 14.
19 J.T. Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFAt s 162-177 (1989), at 176.
, Among the numerous pre-Rio appraisals see P.S. THACHER, BACKGROUND TO
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE GLOBAl. ENVIRONMENT AND COMMONS
(World Federation of United Nations Associations: Project on Global Security and Risk
Management, March 1991); J. MACNEILL, P. WmrSEMIUS & T. YAKuSHmI, BEYOND
INTERDEPENDENCE (Oxford University Press, 1991); R. Falk, Toward a World Order
Respectful of the Global Ecosystem, 19 BOSTON COLLEGE ENV. AFFAIRS L. REv. 711-724
(1992); H.F. French, After the Earth Summit: The Future of Environmental Governance,
WORLDWATCH PAPER No. 107 (Worldwatch Institute, March 1992); L.A. KIMBALL,
FORGING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT: STRENGTHENING INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSTITU-
TIONS FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (World Resources Institute, April 1992); G.
Palmer, New Ways to Make Environmental Law, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 259-283 (1992);
G. Palmer, An International Regime for Environmental Protection, 42 WASH. U.J.
URBAN & CONTEM. L. 5-19 (1992), and comments by A.S. Miller, G. Gelfand & A.D.
Tarlock, at 21-53; and the NGO "Hague Recommendations" summarized in BIODIVERS-
ITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (S. Bilderbeek ed., Netherlands National Committee for IUCN, 1992), at 124-156.
11 Institutional Proposals, UNCED Doe. A/CONF.151/PC/102 (1992).
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As negotiations during PrepCom 3 (Geneva, August 1991)
and PrepCom 4 (New York, March 1992) began to focus on
arrangements for UNCED follow-up, it soon became clear that
there was no majority support for radical innovations, let alone
utopia. The recommendations for institutions and law-making
that finally emerged (mainly under chapters 38 and 39 of Agenda
21), eventually to be confirmed and specified by the UN General
Assembly and the Secretary General in December 1992,62 were
of more modest dimensions:
" at the intergovernmental level, a new 53-member ECOSOC
Commission on Sustainable Development, mainly to carry
out public audits of the performance of governments and
international organizations in their implementation and fi-
nancing of Agenda 21;
" at the secretariat level, a new UN Department for Policy
Coordination and Sustainable Development headed by an
Undersecretary-General at New York headquarters, and an
Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development un-
der the existing UN Administrative Committee on Coordi-
nation; and
* at the expert level, a High-level Advisory Board of eminent
persons, reporting to the Secretary General and through
him to the Commission.
In addition to these UN bodies, UNCED witnessed the emer-
gence of two further institutions likely to have a major impact
also on the future development of international environmental
law:
* a restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF), 63 already
designated to operate the "financial mechanisms" of the
Report of the UN Secretary-General on Institutional Arrangements to Follow
Up UNCED, UN Doc. A/47/593 and Add.l (1992); UN Press Releases SG/A/516 and
SG/A/520 of December 4, 1992; and UN General Assembly Resolution 47/191 of
December 22, 1992. See also L.A. Kimball, Toward Global Environmental Management:
The Institutional Setting, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. (1992), 18-42; and General Assembly
Creates CSD, NaTWOa No. 21 (Geneva: Centre for Our Common Future, November
1992), at 1,4. For a summary account of the UN General Assembly negotiations see the
TE EAxrst NEooTiAroNs Buu.arNq, vol. 3 Nos. 1-3 (November-December 1992) issued
by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, as successor to the EARTH
Sumsr Bu~tanN (note 8 above).
61 On the establishment of the GEF see W.P. Ofosu-Ainaah, C.E. Di Leva & R.U.
Osterwoldt, World Bank, 2 Y.B. INT'L EN . L. 403, at 407 (1991); Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law-US, Multilateral Lending Activities: Development Assistance
and Sustainable Development, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENr. L. 233, at 235-237 (1991); see also
I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and the Environment: A Legal Perspective, 16 MARY-
LAND J. INT'L L. & TRAE, 1-42 at 31-36 (1992).
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two Rio Conventions on an interim (and possibly perma-
nent) basis, and expected to serve as funding channel also
for other components of Agenda 21, including future legal
instruments such as the proposed 1994 Desertification Con-
vention. Restructuring of the GEF (under the auspices of
the World Bank, in cooperation with UNDP and UNEP)
for the post-1993 period following its current three-year
pilot phase was already initiated by a GEF Participants'
Meeting in April 1992," endorsed by Agenda 21 (paragraph
33.14), and is now under intergovernmental negotiation.
0 an independent, non-governmental Earth Council has been
established with headquarters in San Josi (Costa Rica).
65
One of the declared objectives of the Council is to become
a focal point for NGO cooperation in UNCED follow-up;
some have already compared its potential "watchdog" role
to that of Amnesty International." Together with other
nongovernmental bodies established during UNCED pre-
parations and continuing in operation (such as the Geneva-
based Business Council for Sustainable Development),67 the
Earth Council illustrates the widening scope of NGO par-
ticipation in the post-Rio period.
Among other new actors scheduled to make their debut on
the global scene during that period are the Conferences of Parties
to the two Rio conventions. The potential for "inter-treaty con-
flicts" in this field is growing, not only vis-&-vis existing trade-
driven agreements," but also between different environmental
" See GLOBAL ENVIRONMNT FACnlrY: THE PIxr PHASE AND BEYOND (GEF Work-
ing Paper No. 1, May 1992); and GEF, Report by the Chairman to the December 1992
Participants' Meeting (November 1992) at 23-26.
" Joint Press Release by Costa Rican President Rafael Angel Calder6n and Maur-
ice Strong, San Jos6, September 3, 1992; and Earth Council New Release, Washington
DC, October 8, 1992. See also Agenda 21, paragraph 38.45.
" P.M. Haas, M.A. Levy & E.A. Parsons (note 3 above), p. 31.
7 See S. Scm IDsansY, CHA NG CouRSE: A GLOBAL BusIrass PERspECT E ON
DEvELOPmEN AND nm ENVIRONMENT (Cambridge/Mass: MIT Press 1992); and The
Business Council for Sustainable Development: Phase Two?, NETwoRK No. 21 (Geneva:
Centre for Our Common Future, November 1992), 12. Also following the Rio Confer-
ence, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established a "World Industry
Council for the Environment" (headquartered in Paris), absorbing the former ICC
International Environmental Bureau.
0 See Agenda 21, paragraph 39.3(g); see also note 55 above, and J. Cameron &
J. Robinson, The Use of Trade Provisions in International Environmental Agreements
and Their Compatibility with the GATT, 2 Y.B.INT'L ENV. L. 3-30 (1991); K.G.
Beacham, International Trade and the Environment: Implications of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade for the Future of Environmental Protection Efforts, 3 Co.
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instruments and their governing bodies competing for normative
authority. 69 While UNCED brought no basic changes in the
mechanisms of international law-making or dispute resolution,
it focused attention on the implementation and "effectiveness"
of existing environmental conventions ,7 including the need for
progress reports to the new Commission from the Conferences
of Parties. 7' Another significant shift of emphasis prominently
reflected in chapters 8 and 39 of Agenda 21 is the recognition
of imbalances in treaty-making and treaty operation that had
placed developing countries at a disadvantage in practice and
therefore need to be redressed by remedial measures, including
assistance, training and financial support in the course of treaty
negotiation and implementation. 72
The Rio Conference may have succeeded in averting-or at
least postponing-a North-South showdown, the head-on con-
frontation between developed and developing countries which
many had predicted.73 What it could not avoid or defer was a
trend towards further polarization, manifested not only in the
constant balancing (based on parity or alternation) of "North-
ern" and "Southern" positions on everything from meeting
J. INT'L ENv. L. & POL'Y 655-682 (1992); and J.H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WAS. & LEE L. REv. 1227-1278
(1992).
9 E.g., according to the principles for restructuring the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), as agreed in April 1992 (note 64 above), an intergovernmental Partici-
pants' Assembly is to "direct the utilization of GEF funds". Yet, when the Climate
Change and Biodiversity Conventions designated the GEF to operate their interim
"financial mechanism", they also provided that it shall function "under the guidance"
(Article 11, Climate Change Convention) or "under the authority and guidance" (Article
21, Biodiversity Convention) of the respective intergovernmental Conferences of the
Parties to these conventions.
70 See Agenda 21, paragraph 39.8, and the 1992 UNEP Programme (note 13
above); see also UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/103 (January 1992), and the collected
UNCED Research Papers in THa EFF-EcnvEaNss OF INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS (P.H. Sand ed., Cambridge/UK: Grotius Publications, 1992), 539 pp.
1, UNGA Resolution 47/191 (note 62 above), paragraph 3(h); see generally K.
Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Standards: Reflec-
tions on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENv. L. 31 (1991); J.H.
Ausubel & D.G. Victor, Verification of International Environmental Agreements, 17
ANNUAL REV. ENERGY ENVIRON. 1-43 (1992).
2 Agenda 21, paragraphs 8.15, 8.22, 39.1(c) and 39.9; see also the examples of
imbalance given in UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/103 (note 70 above), paragraphs
12-16.
7 See the remarks by G. Biggs, Issues Relating to the 1992 Brazil Conference on
the Environment, [1992] ASIL, PROCEEDINGS 401, emphasizing the spirit of cooperation
that prevailed in PrepCom debates. See also Speth and Brock (note 3 above).
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venues and committee chairmen to agenda priorities, 74 but also
in a distinct new bipolar pattern of negotiating and decision-
making procedures. As an illustration, when the drafting group
for the Rio Declaration reached an impasse during PrepCom 4,
the negotiators desperately called for a meeting room more
conducive to consensus than the usual UN conference halls which
are either auditorium-shaped or symmetrically arranged for del-
egations opposing each other. The only room with a perfect
round table, and the one ultimately selected for that reason, was
Conference Room 8. When delegations arrived, however, the
"Group of 77" immediately insisted that exactly one half of the
circle be occupied by representatives of developing countries,
while all other delegations were to sit along the other half, with
the chairman (agreed to alternate for each session, North after
South) seated at the intersection." That configuration of sym-
metric semicircles prevailed throughout the series of night ses-
sions which followed, until the group ran into terminal deadlock,
ultimately to be salvaged by direct intervention of PrepCom
chairman Tommy Koh.76
The "semicircles syndrome" appears to have become symp-
tomatic of contemporary multilateral negotiations. In the envi-
ronmental context, the model most frequently cited now is the
Executive Committee of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral
Fund, established on an interim basis at the 1990 London
conference 77 and reconfirmed as a permanent institution at the
1992 Copenhagen conference:78 the Committee consists of 7 rep-
resentatives of developing countries and 7 from "other" coun-
tries, with the chairmanship alternating annually between both
7 In a typical, though unsuccessful move in the Rio Main Committee negotiations,
the European Community tried to trade off "Northern" agreement to a future Deser-
tification Convention (note 47 above) against "Southern" agreement to a Forest Con-
vention.
7, The delegates of the Russian Federation and other former "Eastern" countries
grudgingly accepted to be seated with the "Northern" semicircle. The delegate of the
Vatican (who had a major stake in the negotiations because of the population issue in
principle 8) chose to sit at the other intersection, across from the chairman, where North
also met South.
76 See the summary account by Mann (note 33 above), at 408.
Amendments to Article 10 of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, paragraph 5, and Appendix II to Decision 11/8 of the London
Conference; text in 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991) and UNEP, HANDBOOK FOR THE MONTREAL
PROTOCOL ON SumsTANCEs THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER 98-99 (1991).
71 Fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
(Copenhagen, November 23-26, 1992), decision IV/17.
1992-931
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.
groups. Although there are earlier examples of bipolar systems
of governance-e.g., the balance of producing and consuming
countries established in international commodity agreements, such
as the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement 9-the
Montreal Protocol was first in drawing the line explicitly between
developing countries and others,1O corresponding to what Gus
Speth has called the new North-South "axis of world affairs"
confirmed by the Earth Summit. 1
The closest analogy to this bipolar regime is of course the
ritual balance formerly maintained in East-West relations, most
typically reflected in the governance system of multilateral agree-
ments under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for
Europe. 2 The major difference, however, is that the post-Rio
North-South semicircles are mutually exclusive and allow no
third segment, no neutral or "non-aligned" group. While coun-
tries may de facto "graduate" from the status of developing
countries, 3 or may in turn drop below the $4,465 threshold of
annual per capita income, there is no non-alignment option:
poverty rarely is a matter of choice-tertium non datur.
I Article 10 of the Agreement allocates equal numbers of votes to producing and
consuming members; text in UNEP, SELECTED MuLTnLATERAL TREATIES IN TIM FIELD OF
TmE ENVIRONMENT, vol. 2 (note 10 above) at 274.
The status of "Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5" (which in turn
requires "developing country" status, i.e. a Southern list) is determined by the Confer-
ence of the Parties, normally on the basis of a country's entitlement to UN technical
assistance; see Decision 1/12 (E) of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties
(Helsinki, 1989), and Decision IV/7 of the Fourth Meeting (Copenhagen, 1992). The
1992 Climate Change Convention carried the differentiation process a step further by
annexing a Northern list ("developed country Parties and other Parties") to the treaty
text.
" Note 3 above at 146.
The UN/ECE model (which included elaborate, though mostly unwritten, "cau-
cus" rules) has actually been suggested as a model for global environmental governance;
see E.M. Chossudovsky, East-West DIPLOMACY FOR ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS
(Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1988); and E.M. Chos-
sudovsky, The High-level Meeting within the Framework of the ECE on the Protection
of the Environment: A New Model for 'East-West" Co-operation Through Conference
Diplomacy?, TuE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AT GENEVA: SCOPE AND PRACTICES OF MUL-
T.ATERAI DIPLOMACY AND CO-OPERATION 355-349 (M.A. Boisard & E.M. Chossudovsky
eds., Geneva: United Nations Institute for Research and Training, 1992).
'1 In the World Bank, when a borrowing member country reaches a certain level
of per capita GNP (currently $4,465), a review is made to phase out and ultimately end
Bank lending; attainment of the GNP threshold does, however, not automatically ter-
minate a country's entitlement status (which also applies to the Global Environment




The Rio Conference did not usher in the "New International
Ecological Order" many had hoped for; 4 nor was it probably a
"turning point in the history of civilization."8 5 But then-a
propos historical comparisons-neither was any other diplomatic
conference over the past two centuries or so, including the two
largest ones (Vienna 1815 and Versailles 1919) invoked in my
introduction.
Yet as regards international environmental law, UNCED's
prospects of success may well be more promising. Curiously,
both the Vienna and the Versailles Conferences left a more
durable legacy in this particular field than with regard to their
primary political targets: The one lasting accomplishment of the
1815 Vienna Congress was the system of international water-
course agreements which it mandated for Europe 6 and which to
this date provides the legal basis, e.g., of the current Regulations
for the Carriage of Dangerous Substances on the Rhine River
(ADNR).8 7 Similarly, it was the 1919 Versailles Conference which
established the ILO system of international labour conventions,"8
resulting in the first global ban on a toxic chemical, the 1921
Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting still
in force today. 9 If the legal instruments emanating from Rio
turn out to be as robust as that, UNCED will have been worth
the effort.
" Pronk (note 44 above).
85 As suggested in the Earth Summit speech by the President of Nauru, quoted by
Yost (note 8 above).
" See Article 108 et seq. and Annex 16(B) of the Vienna Final Act of June 9,
1815 (2 Martens N.R. 361); see F. Meissner, Rhine River, in: 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUrBLc INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-316 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1990).
11 Adopted by the Central Rhine Navigation Commission on April 29, 1970,
pursuant to the Revised Convention on the Navigation on the Rhine (Mannheim, October
17, 1868, as amended at Strasbourg on November 20, 1963). The Central Commission
was initially established in 1831, in response to the recommendations of the Vienna
Congress. See J.G. Lammers, International Cooperation for the Protection of the Waters
of the Rhine Basin Against Pollution, 5 NEaERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 59-110 (1974), at
98-101.
u In Part XIII of the treaty; see E. von Puttkamer, Versailles Peace Treaty (1919),
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUrnLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-282 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1980); and
A. ALcocK, HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAOUR ORoMIZATION (1971).
" See the UNEP REGISTER OF TREATIES (note 9 above), p. 1. On the ILO experience
with conventions to protect the working environment (including the more recent 1990
Convention concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work) see V.A. Leary,
Working Environment, in: THE EPFECTVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS (note 70 above), at 362-391.
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Meanwhile, there is at least one area where the Rio Confer-
ence has already left its imprint on the evolution of environ-
mental law-by formally anointing the concept of "sustainable
development" for legal use. I still remember the malicious com-
ment by the Brazilian delegate to the UNCED Preparatory Com-
mittee, my good friend Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho (Director of
Environment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and political
scientist by training), after he persuaded Working Group III to
change the term "international environmental law" to read "in-
ternational law of sustainable development" throughout the text
of Agenda 21: "That will keep you lawyers busy well into the
21st century." Judging from the enthusiastic response of the
legal profession, 9° he may be right after all.
9* The International Law Association has established a new Committee on Legal
Aspects of Sustainable Development. The Foundation for International Environmental
Law and Development has scheduled a consultation on "Sustainable Development: The
Challenge to International Law" to be held at Windsor Castle on April 27-29, 1993.
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